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Abstract
It is time to abandon essentialism in emotional research: Our sociodynamic 
model (Mesquita & Boiger, 2014) proposes to study emotions as contextualized 
processes, rather than as states. This does not mean eschewing mental 
processes, but rather studying them dynamically and in open interaction 
with their environment. Our proposal is not to shift the focus of emotion 
studies to a different level. Rather, placing emotions in their social context 
renders their psychological qualities understandable and predictable. This is 
illustrated by some examples from my own cross-cultural research.
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At the end of his commentary, Richard Shweder calls for more 
cross-cultural data to inform our theories of emotion: “One does 
look forward … to tasting (or at least reading) more on-line … 
empirical reports from diverse cultural settings. I for one will 
wait for the tasting; and only then draw strong conclusions 
about the nature and distribution of the ‘emotions.’” (Shweder, 
2014, p. 323). I was struck by this call for “tasting,” because this 
is exactly how I started my career as a cultural psychologist 
interested in emotions.
For the first 15 years of my research career, I “tasted” emotional 
experiences in different cultures (Mesquita, 1993, 2001; Mesquita 
& Karasawa, 2002), and I catalogued the many ways in which 
these experiences were different, based on both my own and other 
people’s research (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Mesquita, Frijda, & 
Scherer, 1997). The work showed that it is certainly possible to 
describe cultural differences in emotions in terms of their compo-
nents: In questionnaire research we found cross-cultural variations 
in terms of the appraisal, action readiness, behavior, and long-last-
ing cognitive consequences that constitute certain emotions.
The different lower level patterns across cultures gave us little 
reason to assume that emotions were essences (see Zachar, 2014). 
But I have come to take nonessentialism one step further, aban-
doning the idea of emotions as states, and focusing instead on 
emotions as processes that develop in context. Granted, it is pos-
sible to describe the emotions of a person at one point in time and 
out-of-context, just as it is possible for a biologist to describe the 
anatomy or the state of a plant without considering its environ-
ment, but we miss some indispensible information. No biologist 
would describe the leaves of the plant as brown, without relating 
this to the fact that the soil is water-deficient. In contrast, many 
emotion psychologists seem satisfied describing the phenomenon 
of interest out of context (see, Mesquita, 2010): The focus of 
much of the field’s theorizing is on emotions as static entities, 
rather than on emoting as a contextualized process.
When I started my cross-cultural research, I asked large 
groups of participants from each culture to freely describe emo-
tional episodes (to interviewers with the same cultural back-
grounds). The goal was to supplement the existing appraisal and 
action readiness questionnaires with culture-specific dimen-
sions (see Mesquita, 2001). However, it gave me the unantici-
pated advantage of looking at hundreds of emotion narratives in 
Dutch, Turkish-Dutch, and Surinamese-Dutch immigrants, 
European Americans, Mexican Americans, and Japanese. 
Appraisal (or componential) theory could be meaningfully 
imposed on the data, and yielded interesting cultural differences 
in the constituting components of emotions.
However, these interviews told me a story of their own, which 
moved well beyond the variations in appraisal and action readiness. 
First, the interviews were not so much stories about inner feelings, 
not even stories of individuals’ perceptions of the world, but to a 
large extent, they were the stories of individuals relating to their 
social contexts. For the most part, they reflected the shifting posi-
tion of the individual in a dyadic relationship, or in a larger social 
context; emotions in many cases mirrored either shifts in power or 
status (see Clay-Warner, 2014), or shifts with regard to other social 
dimensions such as closeness or warmth (Wiggins, 1979). The sec-
ond story that these interviews told us was that emotions develop 
over time, and in connection with events in the environment.
I was trained, to use Moors’ phrasing (2014), as a second 
flavor appraisal theorist (having completed my training with 
Nico Frijda). From this vantage point, it is easy to ignore the 
story that the narratives told us. We did everything to examine 
the data only from within the restrictions of our theory, but what 
the stories really told us was something outside the scope of our 
appraisal theory: emotions are part of social interactions and 
events, and they develop over time.
For example, we asked North American and Japanese partici-
pants to describe an event in which someone else—in this case, 
someone not intimate—had offended them. In the typical 
American scenario for offense by a nonintimate other, the event 
was part of a buildup. But even if we restricted ourselves to the 
definitive blow, participants’ appraisals and action readiness were 
spun out over a longer period of time. Participants reported how 
they tried to gain approval from others for their own view that the 
offender was wrong or even a bad person. This approval then 
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fanned their righteous indignation, and others’ confirmation also 
helped to redeem their self-esteem, and justified their aggression.
The matching Japanese scenario read very differently: Many 
Japanese participants wondered what they themselves could 
have done to prevent the offending situation, or how they had 
given reason for it; they tried to understand the situation from 
the point of view of the offender, and they typically had not 
shared their feelings with other people. Therefore, they did not 
gain social approval for their anger, and they ended up relativ-
izing how much they had been harmed. Their actions differed as 
well: The most common response was “doing nothing.”
Data like these are complex, in part because they force us to 
abandon the sort of essentialism on which our science is based 
(Barrett, 2013). As a consequence, psychologists are not fond of 
these data, as I have found out the hard way (Mesquita et al., 2007 
[unpublished manuscript]). Reviewers have wanted to know if the 
American and the Japanese appraisal and action readiness modes 
respectively, are attributes of “the same thing”: Do Americans and 
Japanese experience the same anger? The question is the remnant of 
a deep-seated belief in essentialism, the belief that there is a thing 
deep down—the emotion of anger—and that we are looking for its 
features. Therefore, if we find different features in different cultures, 
the question becomes: did they really pertain to the same thing?
Our sociodynamic model of emotions (Mesquita & Boiger, 
2014) suggests that emotions are not essences deep down, but 
rather emerge from interactions with the social world. Different 
from Agnes Moors’ suggestion (2014, p. 304), our model 
neither “eschews talk of mental processes” nor “de-emphasizes 
the role of appraisal.” Rather it places mental processes, 
appraisal included, in the context of the social interactions in 
which they occur. Placing emotions in their social context is like 
describing the air and the soil of a plant: It is not merely a different 
level of description, but rather it adds information that renders 
the quality of the emotion understandable and predictable. It 
makes it possible to not just “taste” emotions in different cul-
tures, but to understand just how different tastes were achieved 
in the course of individuals’ interactions with their social worlds.
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Abstract
In reply to the commentaries of Clay-Warner (2014), Gendolla (2014), 
Nesse (2014), Shweder (2014), and Zachar (2014), I repeat the essential 
features of appraisal theories of the second flavor: They take emotional 
components (and not specific emotions) as the phenomenon to be 
explained, and they strive for a multilevel mechanistic explanation that 
leaves room for complex and dynamical processes or mechanisms. Every 
mechanistic explanation starts with an accurate description of regularities 
between inputs and outputs. Regularities do not preclude context-
dependent variety, because there is no limit to the number of input factors 
that can influence the output, and back.
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